Section 64
Police Act 1996

European Court of Human Rights Case Law

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has aggressively examined restrictions on union rights in disciplined services across the continent. While the Court has accepted that some sweeping restrictions are lawful, it routinely reinforces that absolute, complete prohibitions require formidable, unassailable justification.

In cases involving military and security services (such as Matelly v. France or ADEFDROMIL v. France), the Court has rigorously scrutinised whether blanket bans are excessive, particularly probing where less intrusive mechanisms could achieve the same political neutrality and discipline without stripping association rights entirely.

There is no automatic, pan-European legal standard. Each case turns heavily on the specific context, the historical baggage, and the organic national constitutional structure of the state in question.

How the UK Justifies Section 64 (The Core Defense)

The UK government robustly defends Section 64 on the grounds that British policing—which relies on policing by consent rather than martial force—requires absolutely unblemished impartiality. The argument holds that aggressive collective bargaining power inherently politicises the workforce.

Furthermore, the strike risk associated with unions undermines foundational public safety, and a singular statutory association model preserves operational command capability and discipline. Thus, the UK's core argument is not strictly about stopping strikes; it revolves around preventing the systemic politicization and institutional fracturing of the force.

Is the UK Approach Unique?

While the UK is not alone globally in restricting police strike action, its architecture is exceptionally rigid. Several Northern European countries permit active police union membership while fiercely prohibiting the right to strike. Some jurisdictions permit collective bargaining with independent arbitration safeguards. The UK model—mandating a single statutory representative monopoly with no capacity to withdraw labour—is among the most restrictive representation models in the democratic West.

What Would Reform Look Like?

If the constitutional debate forced an evolution, reform could take several mechanical forms:

• 1. Pass legislation to allow union membership generally, but strictly codify strike prohibitions within criminal law.
• 2. Permit pluralistic representation (multiple competing staff associations).
• 3. Maintain the Federation’s statutory status for negotiating pay, but amend Section 64 to allow alternative associations to represent officers on welfare and discipline matters.
• 4. Retain the absolute status quo.

Critically, because the prohibition sits inside the Police Act 1996, any reform would absolutely require fresh primary legislation. The Courts cannot rewrite Section 64 from the bench; they can only flag its constitutional deficit.

What Is a Declaration of Incompatibility?

Should the Courts conclude Section 64 breaches Article 11, under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, higher courts may declare the legislation "incompatible" with Convention rights.

Practical Implications For Officers Today

As the legal structure currently stands in February 2026: Section 64 remains in full force. Operational police officers cannot form or join trade unions for the purpose of influencing pay. The Police Federation of England and Wales retains its absolute statutory monopoly as the representative body for the federated ranks. To date, no higher court has declared Section 64 structurally incompatible. For the officer on response, operational rights and obligations regarding representation remain structurally unchanged since 1996.

Governance Considerations & Risk Analysis

The increasing friction surrounding Section 64 (such as the Broadbent litigation) shifts this from a dry point of law into a heated governance and risk issue impacting member confidence.

It fundamentally engages questions over the accountability of monopolised representative bodies, the lack of pluralistic commercial competition that drives performance in external sectors, and transparency obligations.

Both positions engage highly legitimate, competing constitutional concerns regarding the shape of twenty-first-century state power.